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When digital forensics started in the mid-1980s most of the software used for analysis
came from writing and debugging software. Amongst these tools was the UNIX utility ‘dd’
which was used to create an image of an entire storage device. In the next decade the
practice of creating and using ‘an image’ became established as a fundamental base of
what we call ‘sound forensic practice’. By virtue of its structure, every ﬁle within the media
was an integrated part of the image and so we were assured that it was wholesome
representation of the digital crime scene. In an age of terabyte media ‘the image’ is
becoming increasingly cumbersome to process, simply because of its size. One solution to
this lies in the use of distributed systems. However, the data assurance inherent in a single
media image ﬁle is lost when data is stored in separate ﬁles distributed across a system. In
this paper we assess current assurance practices and provide some solutions to the need to
have assurance within a distributed system.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
The notion of using distributed processing to address
the increasing scale of forensic investigations was ﬁrst
considered in “Breaking the performance Wall” in 2004
(Roussev and Richard, 2004). Despite being revisited
several times since, (Ayers, 2009; Beebe, 2009; Garﬁnkel,
2010; Pringle and Sutherland, 2008; Richard and Roussev,
2006; Richard et al., 2007), this has not been developed
and adopted as a workable solution. There has been a
resistance to the idea of using an architecture where the
data is moved and stored on a multitude of hosts for pro-
cessing. In this paper we brieﬂy consider the technical is-
sues but conclude that the most important reason is the
lack of a forensically sound approach to ensuring infor-
mation assurance within a distributed system. This is
required to ensure evidence management is regulated and
clearly accountable for the legal community..
uk (N. Pringle).
vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWWe will introduce our design for a middleware distrib-
uted processing solution, FCluster, which is speciﬁcally
designed to provide assurance for the integrity of data.
Background
As digital forensic investigation methodologies have
matured to accommodate the developments in technology,
crime and investigative capabilities over the last 20 years,
internal controls have been introduced to provide assur-
ance standards required by the legal process.
Within our expectations of assurance there are a rela-
tively small set of acceptable and ‘trusted’ investigative
tools. FTK and EnCase are two of the most popular and
trusted tools for digital media forensics. We know from
more than a decade of use that their design endows con-
ﬁdence in the investigative process, and this is supported
by these tools being tested for forensic appropriateness by
NIST. In particular, the risk of ‘mixing up data’ between the
evidence media and the host computer is negligible. There
is no realistic way that data from another image could be
introduced because there is no mechanism, other than
operator error working on the wrong image, for this toS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Audit (noun)
1. an ofﬁcial examination and veriﬁcation of
accounts and records, especially of ﬁnancial
accounts.
2. a report or statement reﬂecting an audit;
a ﬁnal statement of account.
Assurance (noun)
1 a positive declaration intended to give
conﬁdence; a promise.
synonyms: word of honour, word, guarantee, promise, pledge, vow,
avowal, oath, bond, afﬁrmation, undertaking, commitment
2 conﬁdence or certainty in one’s own abilities.
synonyms: self-conﬁdence, conﬁdence, self-assurance, belief in
oneself, faith in oneself, positiveness, assertiveness,
self-possession,
self-reliance, nerve, poise, aplomb, presence of mind, phlegm,
level-headedness, cool-headedness
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applications as they were intended, the system is inher-
ently assured. The designers consciously choose not to have
a write-ability, not because it’s just easier that way but
because we have a special need to protect the data under
investigation.
Assurance standards applicable to digital forensics
Unfortunately there are no explicit rules to deﬁne Infor-
mation Assurance for processing Forensic data. Forensic ev-
idencemust adhere to the Daubert principle and the Federal
RulesofEvidence in theUS,ACPOguidelines in theUK(ACPO,
2012) and corresponding criteria elsewhere. ISO 27037 (ISO
27037:2012, 2012) addresses the acquisition and preserva-
tion of digital evidence but uses language such as “protected
as far as possible” and that “evidence should be stored in an
evidence facility that applies physical security controls”.
Standards like ISO17025:2005, intended for ‘chemical’ lab-
oratories, have been the basis of digital forensic facilities but
the translation from the analogue to the digital world is not
always easy. ISO 27001:2013 deﬁnes characteristics of a
management system that provides assurance, but not
assurance itself. PCI-DSS (PCI Security Standards Council)
does provide a more prescriptive standard but doesn’t map
well to digital forensics. When these are appropriate, un-
fortunately they are generally based upon the vague notion
of ‘best practice’ and ‘the accepted norm’ in the particular
ﬁeld. It is difﬁcult to apply in a rapidly developing domain,
such as digital forensics, as technology changes are naturally
always ahead of ‘best practice’ developments.
Internal controls in digital forensics
Inpractical terms, these reveal themselves in someof the
characteristics of an existing system when, for example, a
newitemof evidence is introduced into the lab. Itwouldﬁrst
be recorded in some formof log.When theevidence image is
copied onto the storage facility its success or failure needs to
be validated, perhaps with a cryptographic hash digest, for
example SHA-1, and this is recorded in the log book. The
hash digest is an inherent property of the image. If the
validation fails, the operator would investigate the process
or equipment and make remedies and rerun the copy. This
time, hopefully, it would succeed and the task is complete.
Its success, and theprevious failure, shouldbothbe recorded
on the log book. In a paper system, the log book should have
certain characteristics. The pages should be numbered and
bound together. Anything written should be in ink. Lines on
the page should either have writing or be lined through. If
the log book is implemented on a computer system there
should be an external veriﬁcation, for example a time date
stamp encrypted by PKI, that is beyond the capabilities of
the operator to amend. These sorts of controls are common
and should be familiar to any investigator.
All these processes should be subject to an Audit. By
Auditing, we are checking that the systemworked. Themain
problem with Auditing is that it is reﬂective and it often
implies a protracted period of time passing before the audit.
External audits are often annual, internal audits are perhaps,
quarterly. It addresses issues that occurred in the past,assesses their conformanceornon-conformance and should
trigger changes in the system to prevent further breaches.
This was the case in the quality control employed in
most industries in the Western World after the Second
World War. Generally, goods were manufactured and were
subject to quality control as a ﬁnal stage where a sample set
was tested for conformance. Those non-conforming were
removed and either reworked or scrapped. The audit would
trigger a period of reﬂection and perhaps modiﬁcation to
the production system to reduce the failure rate. Regret-
tably, there was an acceptance that a percentage of non-
conformances would get through the system.
From audit to assurance
During the 1960s the Japanese introduced the idea of
total quality assurance. The most important aspect of this
was that controls were introduced before that action took
place, not after.
The dictionary deﬁnitions give a sense of the retro-
spective nature of an audit (Dictionary.com, 2014) and the
future intent of AssuranceJapanese production lines did not produce faulty goods
because faulty components were not allowed to enter the
production line. The effect of this change on the industrial
base of the western world is a matter of history. During the
1970s and 1980s products from Japan surged leaving their
North American and European competition behind, being
viewed as unreliable. Modern management systems like
Total Quality Management and Six-Sigma have their focus
on controlling inputs and processes during the
manufacturing process. Increases in quality, and customer
satisfaction, are natural consequences of this approach.
Assurance in current computer systems
Most digital evidence from storage media presented in
court is the result of analysis conducted using FTK or
EnCase. This is so much a de-facto standard that we rarely
question it but both systems are based on the same prin-
ciples and on more than a decade of acceptance and pre-
cedence. At its heart is the idea of always presenting
evidence originating ‘from the image’.
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either sections of data or the whole media. When the
investigator copies the image onto the laboratory storage
facility they should run a program to create a new crypto-
graphic hash digest and compare it to the original to conﬁrm
the data is unchanged. There are a number of imaging pro-
grams used with varying assurance. The dd utility has no
internal check-summing facility; both Expert Witness
Format (EnCase) and Smart use ﬁle structures within their
images to checksum every block, typically 64 KB. We are
assured of the integrity of the data because it is seen as one
complete, wholesome entity and is internally consistent.
It is largely left to the administrative system built
around the computer system, as outlined in section 4, to
provide assurance with existing tools that store or process
these images.
Concepts like “Chain of Evidence” or Provenance have
existed in legal proceedings for some time. Although users
will take care of their data, the legal profession does pride
itself on its highest possible standards in this matter. The
ACPO guidelines describe this as a key task of the forensic
practitioner.Distribution of both data and processing
Current systems largely assume that the investigator
will be handling a relatively small number of media items.
In many investigations this might be only one or two
forensic images. This is changing because case volumes are
increasing (Justice FBI, 2012). To cope with this, it has been
suggested that the next generation of forensic software
could adopt a distributed processing model.
At this point we should make a distinction between
distributed processing with centralised storage and
distributed processing working with distributed storage.
Having a distributed processing architecture that relies on a
central, non-distributed, store of forensic images (Fig. 1)
implies that the data has to be distributed to the processing
nodes before it can be subjected to processing.
This is the case with FTK’s ‘distributed’ processing.
Processing time with this topology is dependent on theWorkstation
Workstation
Workstation
Workstation
Fig. 1. The most common current architecture.connection between the switch and the ﬁle server which
rapidly becomes overloaded and limits scalability. We can
mitigate this to some degree by building a storage facility
based on fast SSD storage (450 MB/s), SATA III (600 MB/s)
interfaces and even 10 Gb (1000 MB/s) Ethernet
networking but this can be prohibitively expensive. Even
this has limited capabilities in scaling out to even tens of
processing hosts. Assuming we can make this investment it
can still take many hours just to read the image off the
storage media. If we wanted to conduct simultaneous
analysis of several images held on the same storage facility
it would have a signiﬁcant impact on data dispersal time
and so overall processing time.
Digital forensics is not the only domain that has
encountered this type of problem. Recently, Google solved
their huge data problem by developing and applying a truly
distributed data storage and processing model called
Hadoop/MapReduce (Dean and Ghemawat, 2004).
Although Hadoop/MapReduce provides distributed storage
and processing it lacks the levels of assurance we require in
processing data for presentation as evidence in legal pro-
ceedings. Distributed systems like Hadoop, Condor (Thain
et al., 2005), Nimrod (Abramson et al., 1997), Weka (2014)
and Globus (2014) have been slow to incorporate infor-
mation assurance. Most have some access control but the
users are more interested in getting their data processed
than the nature of the environment in which it is stored.
This is changing. Hadoop, for example, has been extended
by commercial enterprises like Cloudera (2014), who real-
ise that commercial acceptance now requires security but
these are designed and built with general commercial
markets in mind. In these systems it is often up to the user
to exhibit diligence in the processing of a job. It is quite
acceptable to not know where a ﬁle is stored or where it is
processed; in fact it’s a feature of Cloud Computing. There is
some audit trail but rather like event manager inWindows,
it is intended for performance and debugging issues rather
than assurance. Information Assurance has greatly
improved within Hadoop since Cloudera released CDH3 in
April 2011 but it is unlikely that it will ever be extended to
the exacting requirements of the legal process.
In all of these cases, information assurance has been
added on as an after-thought. The assurance inherent in the
legally established idiom of one investigator, one machine,
one image would not be upheld in any current distributed
storage/processing system. It’s entirely understandable
why software vendors don’t support true distribution. It’s
doubtful that anybody would buy the product.
It would be much better if we could adopt a truly
distributed storage and processing approach but built on a
foundation of an assurance system rather than amend the
existing systems.
Images, digital evidence bags and SIPs
The practice of acquiring a digital crime scene in the
form of a ‘forensic’ image has served uswell over the last 20
years but it is now under considerable pressure because of
the size of media needing to be imaged. We feel this will
lead to an increasing adoption of smaller units of storage.
Well known formats such as AFF (AFFLIB) and DEB (Turner,
<metadata ntfs>
This contains detailed information about the 
directory entry and details of which clusters the file 
occupied, together with SHA1 checksums for each 
cluster
</metadata>
<data>
This contains UUencoded version of the data 
that was encrypted with AES-256 with the 
acquisition authority key
</data>
Fig. 2. FCluster SIP structure.
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collectively using a term taken from the ISO 14721, Open
Archival Information System (OAIS) (OAIS, 2014), Submis-
sion Information Package (SIP).
Assurance in distributed storage
As soon as we split ‘the image’ into the SIPs that are
needed to enable distributed processing we lose most of
the inherent integrity of the ‘oneness’ of the image. Sud-
denly we have, perhaps, hundreds of thousands of SIPs to
validate. In what way could assurance be re-established?
Information Assurance while processing SIPs could be
provided in practice using some of the following methods:
 By a Property of an object: making and testing Check-
sums, Check digits, size, Control totals.
 By the Position/Location of the object: the fact that a ﬁle
is in a certain location further enhances our faith that it
is the correct one.
 By Loops of Authority and Acknowledgement: only
accepting data from a device that was authorised to pro-
vide it.
 By Access control: allowing and denying.
 By Separation of process: having functionality provided
by more than one program and clearly separating stages
by function.
 By Audit trail: requiring independent sequential stamp,
indelible records, recording with an authority.
 By Checklist: testing to see if previous checks have been
completed and recording them in a table.
Introducing FCluster
FCluster is a middleware that provides an environment
to allow forensic data processing to proceed with assur-
ance. It is a means by which data integrity can be
controlled; it is not an application program.
The design is based on the following assumptions, derived
from current practice and technological developments.
 Media will continue to grow in capacity and quantity.
 That ‘cross drive’ forensics will be of increasing impor-
tance as individuals have many storage devices, crime is
becoming more organised and forensic analysis systems
will increasingly have to address multi agency interests.
 That multi-agency investigation will increase but will
experience problems sharing and transferring large
datasets.
 That, because of the above, the notion of the ‘image’ is
becoming untenable but will be required for some time
as a legacy. Instead evidential datawill need to be stored
as separate ﬁles across the system. Consequently we
must expect tens, if not hundreds of millions of ﬁles in a
system that stores the contents of many forensic images.
 That in most investigations, the evidence is found in ‘the
obvious place’ and that most investigations are a case of
locating and recording data found.
 The system should allow existing legacy software to run
where possible. This new system should not require Guru
programming skills with knowledge of devices like GPUsto gain access to huge processing power. However if such
programs are developed it should allow these as well.
 That quantity of data requires the development of more
automated tools. These can be simple reporting or
correlating tools but need to run against large datasets.
The FCluster architecture
FCluster is a peer-to-peer middleware for a network of
heterogeneous host computers. The prototype is built on
Ubuntu Linux with future development planned for Win-
dows and MacOS. Most of the code is either in C or Bash
scripts. It uses MySQL, libcurl, ftp servers and ntfs-3g.
FCluster SIPs
FCluster includes a design for an SIP with a simple struc-
turewhich onlyworkswithNTFS ﬁle-systems. Thiswas done
for the sake of simplicity when developing the prototype.
An FCluster SIP comprises of 2 parts (Fig. 2). An exten-
sive header section contains XML delimited meta-data
about the ﬁle’s place on the original evidence media. This
includes data from the ﬁle’s entry in the NTFS $MFT and
also a list of cluster numbers the ﬁle originally occupied on
the source ﬁle-system together with an SHA1 for each of
the clusters. The data section holds the ﬁle data which is
encrypted using AES-256, with the key sent from FCluster,
and then UUencoded to reduce problems in portability.
The SIPs themselves are named in a regular manner,
[VolumeID]-[SHA1].meta. When the SIP is ﬁnally unpacked,
decoded anddecrypted on the FCluster the resultingﬁlemust
have the same SHA1 as its ﬁlename suggests and is included
within the header section of the SIP. To achieve this it must
have been generated on the imagingdevice authorised by the
key created by the FCluster when it authorizes imaging (see
section 14.1) or it will not decrypt when it is ingested into the
FCluster ﬁle system. These form two assurances, one of a
property of the ﬁle, the name and the ‘double entry’ of the
success of the encryption/decryption key.
FCluster subsystems
Applying a principle of separating processes, FCluster
comprises of 4 sub-systems (Fig. 3).
These are explained in more detail in section 14.
Acquisition Ingestion Distribution Processing
Fig. 3. The 4 subsystems with FCluster.
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Each host in the cluster might fulﬁl all the FCluster
functions listed below, but it is likely that most hosts will be
allocated just three or four roles.
 Acquisition Authority
That creates the cryptographic keys used to authorise
imaging.
 Imaging
That creates the directory metadata SIPs, ﬁle data SIPs
and Image ﬁles.
 FClusterfs ﬁle-system metadata storage
The heart of FCluster is a multi-featured File System in
User Space (FUSE) ﬁle system (Filesystem using MyS, 2013)
based around an SQL database.
 SIP Ingestor
That locates expected new evidence SIPs and triggers
ingestion.
 Load Balancer
That chooses which storage/processing host should hold
the primary copy of the data based on its workload.
 Replicator
That makes sure there are enough copies of the SIPs to
ensure redundancy and also veriﬁcation that the data is still
valid.
 Data Storage server
That actually holds the data.
 Processing
Which actually does the processing. Almost always
combined with the storage role.
We believe our proposed system provides assurance at
every stage in such a way that the next stage cannot
commence if the previous assurance is not satisﬁed. The
core of this assurance is embodied in the use of FUSE ﬁle-
system speciﬁcally designed for our purpose.FClusterfs
We have observed that Map/Reduce implements a new
ﬁle system, HDFS, as a base for its processing. This has been
implementedasamiddlewareon topof thenativeﬁle-system
used by the operating system.We follow the same approach.
The use of FUSE to build custom ﬁle systems has been
proposed within the digital forensics domain (Richard
et al., 2007). FClusterfs advances the notion and uses the
technique to provide a solution that addresses the key is-
sues of Assurance in a distributed processing environment.
It merges together several existing FUSE ﬁle systems to
form a new ﬁle system.
FClusterfs is based on MySQLfs (Filesystem using MyS,
2013). MySQLfs employs an SQL database consisting of 3
tables to completely replace the native ﬁle system. The
‘inodes’ table provides storage for ﬁle metadata like names,
dates/times, size, access rights etc usually seen as a
‘directory’. The ‘tree’ table stores the hierarchical structure
of folders and ﬁlenames found in the ﬁle-system. The 3rd
table ‘data_blocks’ stores the actual data as a series of bi-
nary large objects (BLOBs) replacing the clusters of the disk
format.
In FClusterfs we use the tree and inodes tables found in
MySQLfs. FClusterfs provides read-only access and so we
never need to manipulate directories. We have a table
called ‘meta-data’ to store the meta-data from the original
location of the data. This is a variable length, large text ﬁeld
and so is better in a table of its own.
A single FClusterfs database can store many ﬁle-
systems. We have a table, VolumeInformation, which con-
tains a record of each ﬁle-system stored within the inodes
table. We have added a ﬁeld ‘VolumeID’ to inodes to
identify which ﬁle-system the entry relates to.
We substitute the functionality of the ‘data_blocks’ table
in MySQLfs with the ability to read data stored on remote
servers. We have chosen to connect to the remote servers
using the ftp protocol because of the features of another
existing FUSE ﬁle-system curlFTPfs (Robso, 2013). curlFTPfs
allows the user to mount a connection to an ftp server and
make it appear to be part of the host’s ﬁle system. curlFTPfs
attains much of its power and ﬂexibility because it is based
in the libcurl library and can support not only ftp but SSH,
SFTP, HTTP, HTTPS but, despite known security issues with
unencrypted data transfer, we have chosen ftp as a simple
base for a prototype. In a real world scenario, SSH would be
a more robust protocol. curlFTPfs only allows one ftp server
per mounted ﬁle system. In FClusterfs we have enhanced
this to be able to access individual ﬁles on any ftp server on
a ﬁle by ﬁle basis. The corresponding server details are
stored in the ﬁle’s record in additional ﬁlds we have added
to the ‘inodes’ table. When the user sees a directory listing
in their user space it appears as a continuous list drawn
from the ‘inodes’ table but in reality each ﬁle’s data will be
on a ftp server which is most likely remote. Each ﬁle is held
in its entirety on the ftp server. In the prototype the entire
ﬁle is transferred and held in cache in memory. In curlFTPfs
128 MB chunks are transferred just once and, if the ﬁle is
over 128 MB, a mosaic is built in a cache in local memory.
It is important to realise that although FClusterfs does
allow data to be transported across the Ethernet network, it
Host A
ftp server
File2
File3
Fclusterfs
mount
File1
File2
File3
Host B
ftp server
File1
Fclusterfs
mount
File1
File2
File3
127.0.0.1127.0.0.1
Fig. 4. ftp via 127.0.0.1 localhost loopback.
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locally on its own ftp server. Whenwe use the term ‘passes
across the network’ it should be taken as via 127.0.0.1, the
localhost loopback connection (Fig. 4).
FCluster is also peer to peer and so any node can mount
a directory that can reference ﬁles on any server (Fig. 5).
Further, data held on this multitude of ftp servers is
encrypted and uses techniques from ecryptfs (Hicks et al.,
2013) to decrypt data on-the-ﬂy. After it leaves the ftp
server media, it passes across the network and is decrypted
in the user’s host before being held in cached space in RAM
in their Virtual File System.
As previously mentioned, FClusterfs is read-only. There
is no code to provide functions like write/delete/chown/
chmod. This is a fundamental requirement of a forensic
system and, fortuitously, greatly simpliﬁes the code.
FCluster has auditing which it draws from Loggedfs
(Flament, 2013). Loggedfs’ audit is felt to be too granular for
our purposes and instead we choose to record only signif-
icant actions like SIP movement, unpacking and theFig. 5. FCluster mounts peer to peer.opening of data-ﬁles for processing. Recording access to
parts of a ﬁle is felt to be unnecessary and would only slow
the system and make the logs unreadable. All audit records
are stored in a table ‘audit’ recording date/times, users.
Although the data location url information is available
to the user eg ftp://myserver.com/, the username and
password needed to login to the ftp server and gain access
the data is not. It is held in another table ‘serveraccessinfo’
and is retrieved on-the-ﬂy during a read request by
FClusterfs. Users can only access evidence via the FClusterfs
ﬁle-system which provides data from the ftp servers.
FClusterfs is intended to completely replace any need
for network shares like NFS or SMB but to emphasise,
although FCluster provides access to the ﬁle-system under
investigation and will work over a network connection it is
not the most effectiveway towork. It is intended to process
local data by the host of the ftp server holding each of the
ﬁles. The location, url, of the ftp server hosting the data is
part of the ‘inodes’ table extending the ﬁelds used by
FClusterfs and so the ‘locality’ of the ﬁle can trigger the
processing task to be initiated within the host.Mounting the FCluster ﬁle-system
The behaviour of an FClusterfs ﬁle system is deﬁned
when it is mounted by a command line which contains the
following entries:
fclusterfs
–mysql_user¼me
–mysql_password¼mypassword
–mysql_host¼25.63.133.244
–mysql_database¼fclusterfs
–volume¼74a8f0f627cc0dc6
–audituser¼’Investigator Name’
/home/user/Desktop/fsmount
Multiple ﬁle systems can be mounted on the user’s host
system and multiple SQL servers can provide storage for
FClusterfs ﬁle-system databases.
Functional overview – dataﬂow
Having established the component parts of FCluster we
can now demonstrate its operation by following data as it is
gathered and passed into the system.
The initial imaging process has three deliverables:
1 a SIP containing directory metadata.
2 a collection of SIPs, one each for each ﬁle that falls into
a ‘high value’ criteria set by the image acquirer.
3 a conventional ‘forensic image’, for reference and later
extraction of further data.
The selection of ﬁles to be packaged as SIPs takes a
prioritised triage approach collecting only ﬁle types ex-
pected to have a higher likelihood of containing evidence
depending on the case type.
The ﬁrst stage of ingestion into FCluster is when the SIP,
containing the data deﬁning the ﬁle system directory, is
FCluster
Authority
Imaging 
Device
Ingestion
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FCluster
Fig. 6. Acquisition assurance.
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terfs. At this stage a directory skeletonwill exist but no data
is available within FCluster.
The ﬁle data, in the form of a number of SIPs, is imported
as it becomes available. This starts a process of ‘ﬁlling out’
the evidence ﬁle system with data associated with each
directory entry. The data is distributed across the Datan-
odes according to a load balancing algorithm which bases
its allocation on benchmarking previously created by
running a known set of approved programs against typical
data ﬁles.
When a SIP arrives on its storage host, it is unpacked and
its contents are veriﬁed in a number of ways. Only if it is
proven to be valid is it then accepted andmade available via
the distributed ﬁle system, FClusterfs. Upon approval at its
storage location, a deﬁned list of tasks is invoked and
automatic process is conducted, for example generating
text indexing or thumb-nailing images.
To provide redundancy and secondary load balancing, a
replication agent ﬁrstly ensures constant and routine vali-
dation of data by applying an SHA 1 checksum to each ﬁle;
it can then ensure that there are multiple copies of the data,
normally three, held on separate hosts within the cluster.
The SIPs at image time will have, most likely, captured
only part of the evidence. Subsequently a ‘Bag it on de-
mand’ system can trigger an on-the-ﬂy acquisition of data
that was initially deemed of secondary interest within the
image once it has been completed and is available to the
cluster. This data is validated and placed in the same
assured manner as the rest of the system.
How FCluster is conﬁgured as a network system is up to
the administrator but it can form a local or wide area
network. The prototype successfully uses a VPN to connect
the nodes. We’ve extended it to use nodes on AmazonWeb
Services. Whenever data is transferred between nodes is it
always in anencrypted formandso canbe considered safe in
a technical sense but thismaynot be acceptable onprinciple
within a legal environment. The primary objective, and the
core of any speed improvement, is that processing takes
place locally on the datanode holding the data. In a similar
way to the use of SHA1s to identify ‘Bad’ﬁles, the systemcan
be used without the actual ﬁles being accessed. Results are
transferred across the network but not normally the data.
FCluster by stages of assurance
FCluster has 4 ‘zones’ of assurance as shown in Fig. 7. We
now step through then in more detail.
Acquisition assurance
The ﬁrst assurance in the system is one of the “Loops of
Authority and Acknowledgement” type in which authority
is granted to an imaging device to take an image and then
FCluster only accepts data that was gathered with that
authority Fig. 6.
The FCluster administrator generates an ‘Authority to
image’ in the form of a ﬁle which will be issued to a speciﬁc
device. This ﬁle contains a reference number and a
randomly generated key which will be used at acquisition
time to encrypt the data stored in the SIPs. The reference
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table in FClusterfs. Multiple keys can be created and issued
to multiple imaging devices to form a ‘stock of authorities’
to be used over a period of time, the keys have an ‘expiry
date’ associated with them as an added control.
As previously explained, in section 13, the imaging process
has three outputs. The SIP containing ﬁle-systemmetadata is
the ﬁrst to be imported. The reference number under which
the cryptographic key was recorded is located in Vol-
umeInformation table. If it is present, has not expired or has
not been previously fulﬁlled, the import can proceed. The
contents of the SIP is read and the directory meta-data is
decrypted and records for each ﬁle are created in the inodes,
tree and metadata tables. These include ﬁelds that describe
the full path andﬁlename,ﬁle size,MACdates and times etc. If
the key is not present in the VolumeID table, the import
cannot proceed.
At the end of this process a complete ‘framework’ of the
directory structure and ﬁlenames will have been created in
the FClusterfs database. It is actually possible to mount this
FClusterfs structure and traverse the directory but as the
import of ﬁle SIPs that contain ﬁle data has not been carried
out there is no actual data to analyse in the ﬁles.
Ingestion assurance
We now use a series of “checklists” to control the import
of the details and contents of the data-ﬁle SIPs.
The SIP staging directory, where SIPs are placed ready to
be imported, is scanned and any SIPs which form part of a
Volume that is expected to be imported are found and the
header is read to extract details of the VolumeID, path,
ﬁlename and size. The inodes table of FClusterfs is searched
to see if this SIP is expected, ie there is an entry previously
made by a ﬁle-system SIP import. At this stage, various
ﬁelds like the original ﬁle’s SHA1 and staging directory url
should be empty. If there is a record that satisﬁes these
criteria then the ﬁelds in the inodes table are populated
with the meta-data extracted from the data-SIP. If there is a
record in the inodes table and it shows it has already been
imported it will not be considered again.
Distribution assurance
This stage has three components. Load Balancing, Mov-
ing SIPs to their primary destination and unpacking them.
Load balancing
Having ingested the volume directory metadata the
system is now primed to expect the SIPs of data that
makeup that ﬁle system. The selection of the primary
storage of the data is the ﬁrst task of the loadbalancer. It
allocates a storage server to hold the data held within the
SIP and records this in the FCluster inodes table. Allocation
is based on the available capacity of the host, its processing
power and its estimated time to ﬁnish its current task list.
The moveﬁle daemon
The moveﬁle daemon also uses “checklist” type assur-
ance by constantly scanning the inodes table of FClusterfs
for any SIP that has been allocated a datanode, not beenmarked as being ‘in place’ and where the evidence SIP is
staged in a local directory. If these conditions aremet the SIP
is transferred to the storage datanode as allocated by the
loadbalancer. If, and only if, the transfer is successful does
movedata update the inode table with ‘primarystoragein-
place’ set to true. Movedata is the only mechanismwhereby
actual data can be moved around the system. It can only
operate when all the preconditions from Ingestion Assur-
ance are met. It does not simply scan an evidence folder and
move whatever SIPs are present; it moves only expected
SIPs, as recorded in the FCluster inodes table, from a folder.
The unpack daemon
Unpacker daemon constantly scans the inodes table to
see if there are any SIPs that are on their local server but not
unpacked. It takes the entry from the database and looks to
see if the ﬁles are on its ftp host, as should be the case from
the entries in inodes, not the other way round. A ﬁle that
simply arrives on the server without an entry in inodes
would be ignored.When a suitable SIP is identiﬁed it is split
into header and data sections. The header, containing the
metadata is inserted into the ‘meta_data’ table and the
header ﬁle erased. The data section is undecoded and the
data decrypted with a key stored in the VolumeListing
table. This was the key ﬁrst created and issued by the
FCluster and used to encrypt the data in the SIP at acqui-
sition time. If the key does not work, the ﬁle cannot be
decrypted and so unpacking would fail. Only if the ﬁle
decrypts and the resulting ﬁle has an SHA1 checksum that
matches both the name of the ﬁle itself and the SHA1 as
recorded in the inodes table is the dataﬁle ﬁnally accepted.
Processing assurance
The task daemon scans the tasks table to see if any job is
required for a ﬁle that it holds locally. Because all ﬁle access
must take place by utilising the enhanced FClusterfs ﬁle-
system the ﬁle must be the correct ﬁle and must have the
original content that was collected at imaging time. FClus-
terfs also gives us ﬁne grained access control to the ﬁles
within a ﬁle system. We could, if we wished, control which
users can process speciﬁc data with speciﬁc programs.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated that by ensuring a rigorous
protocol when importing SIPs into a distributed cluster we
can provide a level of assurance in data transfer and storage.
Additionally, by adopting the same approach as Hadoop we
have created a prototype of a middleware speciﬁcally
designed to address the assurance requirements required in
the legal process while providing effective distributed pro-
cessing. As to whether this does achieve an acceptable level
we offer this design for further debate. It should be clear
that this design draws upon knowledge frommany domains
and so there is no single criteria set that can be applied.
Speed concerns
AprimaryconcernwithFClusterfs is speedbut inpractice
this has not proven to be a signiﬁcant problem. Firstly, ﬁle
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connection via SMB andNFS shares. FCluster does this in the
samewaybut using the ftpprotocol. These are roughlyequal
or perhaps slightly slower. Secondly, as we havemade clear,
FCluster is read-only and so has no record or ﬁle locking
code. As a result, even when FCluster draws from a remote
ftp server data is cached locally in RAM and never needs to
refer to the source for updates or changes. Thirdly, the sys-
tem is designed so that each storage host should process its
own local data, so the network issue completely disappears.
All distributed systems suffer from a management
overhead. This management issue exists in single host so-
lutions but is exacerbated when management data has to
be passed in messages across relatively slow network
connections rather than using local memory. This limits
scalability but in our initial test we ﬁnd that the effective-
ness of clusters of about 50 hosts on a local Gigabit network
does not degrade signiﬁcantly.
As of Spring 2014, the FCluster prototype is almost
complete and we are starting full assessment. We intend
this to be availablewhen complete viawww.fcluster.org.uk.
Future work
There are many areas in this design that present the
opportunity for further research. Our own priorities would
include rearranging the database structures to implement
the principle of division into subsystems so that the
assurance subsystems are reﬂected in the arrangement of
data within the tables. On network security the use of ftp,
only used as a protocol for ease when building a prototype,
should be replaced with, for example, SSH and use digital
certiﬁcates as authentication. Issues of Governance and
Chain of Custody need to be assessed including compari-
sons with standards like ISO 27037 and OAIS. The design
was always intended to allow existing, legacy, software to
run without alteration. We need to consider how we can
achieve data abstraction above the middleware.Acknowledgements
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